Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species Art 5a Exception Medical Purpose

Instance name	Citation	Summary
ASSOCIACAO SANTUARIO DE ELEFANTES BRASIL	1001993-45.2019.eight.11.0024	This case from Brazil concerns the elephant named "Ramba." Ramba is a former circus elephant who spent more than than 30 years at circuses in Chile and Argentina. On October 18, 2019, she arrived at Santuário de Elefantes do Brasil (Brazil Elephants Sanctuary) after a 73 hour trip all the mode from Republic of chile. Earlier Ramba was transferred, Approximate Leonísio Salles de Abreu Junior, from the 1st Ceremonious Court at Chapada dos Guimarães, the region where the sanctuary is located in Mato Grosso , Brazil, made a ruling irresolute her status from a mere "proficient." The judge prohibited the local Government from charging the sanctuary R$ 50.000 (approximately US $ 13.00) in a taxation on motion of goods finding that Ramba is not a thing, and is not a discipline to importation good tax. Co-ordinate to an commodity at https://world wide web.ambientesecom.net/2019/10/24/groundbreaking-determination-of-brazilian-judge-for-captive-elephant, the judge said farther, "Her position, far from beingness a commodity (as she was in the life of exploitation to what she was submitted to by her old owners), is at present that of a guest, who seeks for a new destination on the margins of what human evil has already caused her." Attached case is in Portuguese.
The International Fund for Animal Welfare (Australia) Pty Ltd and Minister for Environment and Heritage	(2005) 93 ALD 594	Zoos in New Southward Wales and Victoria sought to import asian elephants for conservation and exhibition. The Tribunal considered whether the elephants were being imported "for the purposes of conservation breeding or propagation", the zoos were "suitably equipped to manage, confine and care for the animals, including coming together the behavioural and biological needs of the animals", the importation of the elephants would "be detrimental to, or contribute to merchandise which is detrimental to ... the survival .... or ... recovery in nature of" Asian elephants and whether the elephants were "obtained in contravention of, [or] their importation would ... involve the contravention of, any police force". The importation was immune.
Re The International Fund for Fauna Welfare (Australia) Pty Ltd and Ors and Government minister for Surroundings and Heritage	(2006) 42 AAR 262	Zoos in New Due south Wales and Victoria sought to import v Asian elephants. After an initial hearing, further evidence was sought in relation to the condition and nature of the facilities at the zoos. The Tribunal decided that the importation of the elephants should exist in accord with a permit issued under due south 303CG of the Surroundings Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth).
Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos	--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2019 WL 3817305 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2019)	The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff's members have an "economical and professional interest in. . .the purchase, auction, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory." The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York's natural resource and environment. The Endangered Species Deed (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or motion of endangered species in interstate or strange commerce. The prohibitions, all the same, had exceptions for "antique manufactures" that are 100 years of historic period or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to outset obtain a federal allow. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretarial assistant of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is more often than not prohibited. Just certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The December only issued licenses authorizing merchandise in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Police force's exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the December restricted the ad and brandish of ivory products. Plaintiff'due south filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a move for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and adamant that section 1535(f) did not preempt the Land Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions simply applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Police applied to intrastate commerce. Equally result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Constabulary did non prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Accused's motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not "the articulate and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory." The Plaintiff's second count alleged that the State Ivory Law's permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the The states Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the concrete display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the Country Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-shop display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the brandish constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the brandish restriction directly advanced that involvement. The Court was unable to determine whether the display brake burdened essentially more speech than was necessary to further the government'due south legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Accused's and Intervenor's cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant'due south and Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Subpoena Claim.
Dallas Safari Club v. Bernhardt	--- F.Supp.3d ----, 2020 WL 1809181 (D.D.C. April. 9, 2020)	Individual elephant sport hunters and their hunting organizations ("Plaintiffs") filed suit against the Usa Fish and Wild fauna Service (the "Service") seeking to import their sport-hunted elephant trophies from Africa into the U.s.a.. The Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the Service to process pending and subsequently filed allow applications. The African Elephant is listed as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and is likewise a species that is regulated by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora ("CITES"). All African elephant trophy imports crave the Service to brand an enhancement finding, significant that the killing of the bays beast will enhance the survival of the species, and issue an ESA permit. Additionally, sure African elephant trophy imports require a non-detriment finding and a CITES import let. Historically, the Service made periodic countrywide enhancement and non-detriment findings, notwithstanding, this came to a halt due to a Presidential tweet surrounding media criticism over the Service's conclusion to lift the interruption on Zimbabwe's ESA enhancement finding. The Court found that injunctive relief was not warranted because the Plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm every bit to any Plaintiff. The individual Plaintiffs argued that they had suffered both emotional harm and economic harm. Still, the Plaintiffs were on find that their applications could take a significant amount of fourth dimension to procedure. Additionally, the emotional distress claimed past the Plaintiffs would exist alleviated when the Service issues a decision either granting or denying their allow applications, therefore, the harm that the Plaintiffs were claiming was not irreparable. The Court constitute that the private hunter Plaintiffs' alleged emotional and economic injuries were insufficient to warrant a preliminary injunction. The organizational Plaintiffs argued that they each were suffering irreparable harm derivatively because the Service's delay in processing permit applications would decrease the popularity of sport hunting in Africa and cause a decrease in funding for conservation efforts. The problem was that the organizational Plaintiffs offered no proof to substantiate this statement. The Court ultimately held that in calorie-free of the disruptions caused by COVID-19 and the diminished capacity of the Service to procedure let applications during this unprecedented time, it would exist unwise and not in the public interest to order the expeditious processing of sport bays let applications. The Courtroom denied Plaintiffs' Move for a Preliminary Injunction.
Leider v. Lewis	2 Cal. 5th 1121, 394 P.3d 1055 (2017)	The Plaintiffs, Residents of Los Angeles, brought a taxpayer action against the Defendants, the Metropolis of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Zoo, alleging elephant abuse in violation of various Penal Code provisions. The Superior Courtroom, Los Angeles County, granted the Defendants summary judgment. The Residents appealed. At trial, the Residents were awarded injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court of Appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court rejected many of the Resident's claims, only issued limited injunctions prohibiting utilize of particular forms of discipline, requiring the elephants to have specific amounts of practise time, and requiring the rototilling of soil in exhibit. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of California granted review and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Courtroom held that: (i) the prior Court of Appeals decision was not police of the case every bit to the argument that the Residents was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for comport that violated Penal Code, and (2) the Residents' challenge to the city's treatment of elephants improperly sought injunctive relief for Penal Code violations.
American Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus	2008 WL 3411666 (D.D.C.)	On Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery from Defendants, The Usa District Court, District of Columbia, determined that "primary schedules" and "performance reports" were non documents pertaining to the chaining of elephants, and/or describing practices and procedures for maintaining elephants on the train, and Plaintiffs were therefore not entitled to such documents. The Court could not determine whether certain sound tapes demanded by Plaintiffs pertained to the medical condition or health condition of any Asian elephants in Defendants' custody during a specified time-frame, or pertained to the investigation of Defendants' operation conducted by the Department of Agriculture, without beingness given the opportunity to listen to and review the audio tapes. Plaintiffs' mere speculation that Defendants hired an exterior consulting firm to follow and/or counteract a previous employee's efforts did not entitle Plaintiffs to any farther judicial action.
Nonhuman Rights Projection, Inc. ex rel. Beulah v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc.	2017 WL 7053738 (Non Reported in A.3d) (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 26, 2017)	In this instance the petitioner, Nonhuman Rights Projection, Inc., sought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of three elephants, Beulah, Minnie, and Karen, which are owned by the respondents, R.Due west. Commerford & Sons, Inc. and William R. Commerford, as president of R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc. The issue was whether the court should grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus because the elephants are "persons" entitled to liberty and equality for the purposes of habeas corpus. The court denied the petition on the footing that the court lacks bailiwick matter jurisdiction (because the plaintiffs lacked standing) and the petition was wholly frivolous on its face in legal terms (elephants are not "persons" according to the court). The court he court dismissed the petition for writ of habeas, just pointed to the state'southward anti-cruelty laws "as a potential alternative method of ensuring the well-beingness of any animate being."
Safari Guild International v. Jewell	213 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2016)	Safari Gild International and the National Rifle Association filed suit challenging the federal government's intermission of imports of trophies from elephants sport-hunted in Republic of zimbabwe. In April of 2014, the U.South. Fish and Wildlife Service ("the Service") suspended imports of trophies from elephants on the basis that the Service could no longer make the finding required under its regulations "that the killing of the animate being whose bays is intended for import would enhance survival of the species." Safari Club asserted 4 primary arguments against the Service's suspension of imports: (1) the bureau violated APA rulemaking requirements past non providing for observe and comment; (2) the agency applied prohibited guidelines and the wrong standard in making its findings; (3) the agency failed to overcome a statutory presumption in Section 9(c)(a) of the Endangered Species Act; and (4) the bureau violated the APA past failing to explicate why it maintained the enhancement finding requirement in the Special Rule later on the requirement was eliminated from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife and Flora (CITES). The court reviewed Safari International's arguments and granted summary judgment merely with respect to the argument that the Service had failed to publish notice of the changed Zimbabwe enhancement finding in the Federal Register until May 12, 2014. The court dismissed the remaining arguments put along by Safari International and granted summary judgment in favor of the Service. The courtroom found that the Service had violated its commitment to publish any notice of a change in the Federal Register before the change can take consequence. The Service violated this commitment by publishing notice of the suspension of imports of trophies in the Federal Annals on May 12, 2014 simply making the effective appointment of the suspension April four, 2014. For this reason, the courtroom constitute that the effective date of the interruption must be changed to May 12, 2014. With respect to Safari International'southward other arguments, the court establish that Safari International was unable to run into its burden and held in favor of the Service.
Elephant, Inc. 5. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.	239 So.2d 692 (La.App., 1970)	A veterinarian agreed to house, transport, and care for an elephant at no charge other than the actual expenses incurred therewith. One evening, the elephant ingested some poison left in its stall past the veterinarian and later died.  On appeal of the trial courtroom accolade to plaintiff, the Court disagreed with defendant's contention that he, as a complimentary depositary, could only be held liable for gross negligence, willful misconduct, or fraud. In fact, the civil code in Louisiana, states the burden of a depositary is "that of ordinary intendance which may exist expected of a prudent man."  However, an  agreement between the parties was institute to release Dr. Cane of liability from negligent acts.
Leider 5. Lewis	243 Cal. App. quaternary 1078 (Cal. 2016)	Plaintiffs, taxpayers Aaron Leider and the belatedly Robert Culp, filed suit against the Los Angeles Zoo and Director Lewis to enjoin the continued operation of the elephant showroom and to forestall construction of a new, expanded exhibit. Plaintiffs contend that the Zoo'southward comport violates California animal cruelty laws and constitutes illegal expenditure of public funds and property. The example went to trial and the trial court issued limited injunctions relating to forms of discipline for the elephants, exercise time, and rototilling of the soil in the showroom. On appeal by both sides, this court first took upward whether a taxpayer action could be brought for Penal Code violations or to enforce injunctions. The Court held that the earlier Court of Appeals' decision was the law of the case as to the argument that the plaintiff-taxpayer was precluded from obtaining injunctive relief for conduct that violated the Penal Code. The Courtroom plant the issue was previously decided and "is non defeated past raising a new statement that is essentially a twist on an earlier unsuccessful statement." Further, refusing to utilise this Civil Lawmaking section disallowment injunctions for Penal Code violations will not create a substantial injustice. The Courtroom as well found the gild to rototill the soil was proper because it accords with the "spirit and letter" of Penal Code department 597t (a police concerning exercise time for confined animals). As to whether the showroom constituted animal cruelty under land law, the Court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court declined to make such a finding. Finally, the Court upheld the lower courtroom's ruling that declined further injunctive relief under department 526a (a police force that concerns deportment against country officers for injuries to public property) considering the injury prong could not exist satisfied. As stated past the Court, "We agree with the trial court that there is no standard past which to measure this type of impairment in social club to justify closing a multi-1000000 dollar public exhibit."
American Society For Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus	246 F.R.D. 39 (D.D.C.,2007)	In this case, the court considered the parties' respective motions for reconsideration. On Baronial 23, 2007, the Court granted summary judgment to defendant as to elephants subject field to a convict-bred wild animals ("CBW") permit and denied summary judgment every bit to elephants for which defendant claimed a "pre-Act" exemption. Accused has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court'due south decision regarding the "pre-Act" elephants and plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration challenging the Court'southward decision regarding the CBW let elephants. Defendant's motion was granted in part as to the standing of plaintiff, Tom Passenger. The courtroom held that Rider'southward standing is now limited to those six elephants to which he became "emotionally fastened." Notably, the court concluded its opinion with a "hint to the wise" that the court will not tolerate whatever further filings inconsistent with FRCP.
Born Free Us 5. Norton	278 F. Supp 2d v (D.D.C. 2003)	The zoo sought to import wild elephants from a foreign land, merely advocates contended that the officials did not follow CITES properly for the import. The court held that the advocates failed to show a likelihood of success to warrant preliminary injunctive relief, since no overall detriment to the species was shown.
Ivory Education Institute v. Department of Fish and Wildlife	28 Cal. App. 5th 975 (Ct. App. 2018), equally modified (Nov. v, 2018), review denied (Jan. sixteen, 2019)	The Legislature passed Assembly Pecker 96 which took consequence July 1, 2016 as Fish & Game Code section 2022. The pecker imposed new restrictions on the sale and importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. The Ivory Teaching (the Constitute) sued the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (the Section) in order to cake implementation of the law. The institute alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on multiple grounds including vagueness, federal preemption, the takings clause, and the commerce clause. The trial court entered judgment for the Department and the intervenor defendants (the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Center for Biological Diversity, the Humane Society of the United States, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, and the Wild animals Conservation Society). The Plant appealed and abandoned all other issues raised and express its challenge to the void-for-vagueness doctrine. "The Institute contend[ed] that section 2022 [was] unconstitutionally vague for two reasons: one) while information technology allows for the sale or import of ivory insofar as it is allowed by federal law, differences in what federal law allows make information technology almost impossible to tell what would qualify for the exemption provided by department 2022(c)(c); and 2) in that location are no guidelines by which to determine the permissible volume of ivory in either musical instruments or antiques." The Court of Appeals stated that a statute is not vague if its pregnant tin exist determined past looking at other sources of information. Those who wish to comply with section 2022 have a duty to locate and examine statutes or any else necessary to determine the scope of the exemption provision. "Section 2022 has a single purpose—to prevent the sale or importation of ivory and rhinoceros horn. Both of those terms are defined. The Institute has 'not demonstrated that attempts to requite substance and pregnant' to the iii disputed exceptions 'would be fruitless.'" As for the Institute'southward second contention, the Court of Appeals stated that considering musical instruments and antiques are tangible objects that occupy a verifiable corporeality of 3-dimensional infinite, the percentage of whatever such object that has ivory in information technology can be readily determined. The Courtroom of Appeals held that the statute was non vague. The Court affirmed the holding of the trial court.
Sebek five. City of Seattle	290 P.3d 159 (Launder.App. Div. one,2012)	Two Seattle taxpayers filed a taxpayer activeness lawsuit against the metropolis of Seattle for violating Washington'south creature cruelty statute and Seattle's beast cruelty ordinance with regard to a zoo'due south elephant exhibit. After the lawsuit was dismissed by the Male monarch County Superior Court for lack of taxpayer continuing, plaintiffs appealed the court'south conclusion. The appeals courtroom affirmed the lower court's determination because the plaintiffs' complaint alleged the zoological society, not the city, acted illegally and considering the operating agreement between the city and the zoological society made information technology clear that the zoological club, not the urban center, had exclusive command over the operations of the elephant exhibit. Significantly, the appeals courtroom found that a city's contractual funding obligations to a zoological society that  cares and owns an fauna exhibit at a zoo is not enough to allege a city violated animal cruelty laws.
Rowley v. Metropolis of New Bedford	333 F.Supp.3d 30 (D. Mass. Sept. 25, 2018)	This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' movement to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Human action. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary intendance, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a fellow member of the zoological club there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in "an artful, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years." The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the outcome of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a move to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To brainstorm, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did non encounter that finding. Here, Rowley'southward complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo'south Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability considering she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded past New Bedford's claim that Rowley has non established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very excursion that "aesthetic injury" tin be established past viewing animals in inhumane weather condition. In add-on, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the courtroom constitute Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently declared that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley'due south request for a declaratory judgment equally to the Zoo'south treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability statement because Rowley did not suggest how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the courtroom does non need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient continuing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied.
Reece 5. Edmonton (City)	335 DLR (4th) 600; 513 AR 199; [2011] CarswellAlta 1349; 530 WAC 199	This case dealt with the process the applicants used to become their merits heard past the court. The respondent Metropolis holds a licence under the Wild animals Act, R.South.A. 2000, c. Westward‑ten to operate a zoo, which houses a lone Asian elephant named Lucy. The appellants commenced this activity by originating notice for an social club. The chambers judge concluded that the proceedings were an corruption of process because a private litigant cannot seek a declaration that the respondent is in breach of a penal provision in a statute, namely that the elephant was kept in distress considering of health concerns. Alternatively, he concluded that the application should take been brought by manner of statement of merits, non originating discover. Further, the chambers estimate ended that the appellants had no private interest standing, and that in that location were barriers to them beingness awarded public interest continuing. On appeal, the parties raised two issues: (1) whether the chambers judge erred in denying the appellants standing to seek a declaration; and (2) whether the chambers judge erred in terminal that the proceedings were an abuse of process. This court held that the chambers guess came to the correct conclusion that these proceedings are an abuse of process. Entreatment DISMISSED.
Fortgang five. Woodland Park Zoo	387 P.3d 690 (Wash. Jan. 12, 2017)	To address the Zoo's growing size and complexity, Defendant Woodland Park Zoo Society (WPZS) entered into an "Operations and Management Agreement" (Understanding) with the City of Seattle. The Understanding gave WPZS sectional rights and responsibilities regarding many areas such as the intendance, sale, and purchase of the Zoo's animals. The Understanding also contained several provisions addressing public oversight of the Zoo.  Plaintiff Alyne Fortgang requested several categories of records, all pertaining to the Zoo's elephants. She filed the request under the Public Records Act (PRA), which requires every regime agency to make records available for public inspection and copying.  The Zoo's managing director of Communications and Public Affairs responded to Fortgang's request past asserting that the PRA did not apply considering WPZS was a private company. Fortgang filed a lawsuit and alleged that WPZS violated the PRA by refusing to disclose certain records. The trial court granted WPZS'due south move for summary judgment and dismissed the action on the ground that WPZS was non an agency field of study to PRA disclosure requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals and held that the Telford examination was the proper analytical framework for evaluating the private entity'southward disclosure requirement. The Supreme Court reasoned that under the Telford assay, WPZS was not the functional equivalent of a government agency. The court stated that although the second Telford factor was inconclusive, all the other factors weighed against PRA coverage: (1) WPZS did not perform an inherently governmental function by operating the Zoo; (2) the Urban center did not exercise sufficient command over the Zoo's daily operations to implicate PRA concerns; (three) WPZS was created solely by individual individuals and not  government action and (4) because operating a zoo is not a nondelegable, "core" government function, the example did not involve the privatization of fundamentally public services. The Court of Appeals' conclusion was affirmed.
American Society For The Prevention of Cruelty To Animals, v. Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus	502 F.Supp.2d 103 (D.D.C., 2007)	Plaintiffs-ASPCA filed accommodate against Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus and Feld Entertainment, Inc, under the citizen-adjust provision of the Endangered Species Deed.  Plaintiffs allege that FEI routinely beats elephants, chains them for long periods of time, hits them with sharp bull hooks, breaks babe elephants with forcefulness to make them submissive, and forcibly removes babe elephants from their mothers before they are weaned. This comport, plaintiffs argue, violates the "accept" provision of the ESA. In the court'due south opinion regarding defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court held that the pre-Human action exemption does non insulate defendant from claims of taking under the ESA. Even so, the court found that the convict-bred wild animals (CBW) let held by defendant does not allow for challenge under a citizen-conform provision.
H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Brown	519 F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in function sub nom. H.J. Justin & Sons, Inc. v. Deukmejian, 702 F.2d 758 (9th Cir. 1983)	In this case, plaintiff filed suit challenging the California Penal Code, specifically sections 653o and 653r. Plaintiff manufactured boots from the hides of animals, including the hides of the African elephant, the Indonesian python, and the Wallaby kangaroo. Section 653o and 653r of the California Penal Code prevented plaintiff from selling his boots in California considering the provisions prevent the auction of products made from dead bodies, or any part of the elephant, python, or kangaroo. Plaintiff challenged these provisions arguing that the provisions were preempted by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild animals and Flora and by the Endangered Species Deed of 1973, thus making the provisions unconstitutional. The plaintiff likewise argued that the provisions were unconstitutional because of the burden placed on interstate commerce which violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Ultimately, the court held that the provisions of the California Penal Code were not unconstitutional and dismissed plaintiff'due south claim. The courtroom looked to whether or not the provisions were expressly or impliedly preempted and determined that because the provisions were not expressly preempted the court needed to do an analysis of implied preemption. Looking to legislative history, the court establish that Congress did not intend to preempt the provisions of the California Penal Code with the enactment of the Endangered Species Human activity of 1973. Lastly, the court held that the California statue was not a burden on interstate commerce because Congress was aware of the existence of the California provisions and decided that the Endangered Species Act would not affect the California provisions. As a consequence, the court dismissed plaintiff's merits and held for the defendant.
Feld Entertainment, Inc. v. A.S.P.C.A.	523 F.Supp.second 1 (D.D.C., 2007)	Pending before the Court is Accused American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, et al.'s ("ASPCA") Move to Temporarily Stay All Proceedings. The suit arises from Feld Entertainment, Inc. ("FEI") claim confronting the ASPCA and other defendants, including Tom Rider, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). The gravamen of plaintiff'south complaint is that defendant Tom Passenger has been bribed by the organizational defendants to participate in the ESA Action against FEI in violation of federal constabulary. The court agreed that the public interest in the ESA merits weighs in favor of granting the temporary stay.
American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc.	659 F.3d thirteen (C.A.D.C., 2011)	The Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit, affirmed the lower courtroom's finding that plaintiffs lack standing to sue Ringling Brothers and Barnum & Bailey Circus for violation of the Endangered Species Act. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the use of two training methods for controlling elephants, bullhooks and chaining, plant a "taking" under the Deed. Hither, the court found no clear mistake past the district court as to erstwhile employee Tom Passenger's standing to sue where Rider's testimony did not testify an injury-in-fact. Equally to API'south standing, the court held that API did not encounter either informational standing or continuing under a Havens test.
American Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc.	677 F.Supp.second 55, 2009 WL 5159752 (D.D.C., 2009)	This opinion represents the 9-year culmination of litigation brought by plaintiff Tom Rider and Animal Protection Institute (API) against Defendant Feld Entertainment, Inc. ("FEI") - the operator of Ringling Bros. and Barnum & Bailey traveling circus. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant'southward utilise of bullhooks and prolonged periods of chaining with respect to its circus elephants violates the Endangered Species Human action, sixteen UsC. § 1531, et seq. This Court held that plaintiffs failed to establish continuing under Commodity Iii of the U.s.a. Constitution and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Since the Court ended that plaintiffs lack standing, it did not reach the merits of plaintiffs' allegations that FEI "takes" its elephants in violation of Section 9 of the ESA.
Safari Club International 5. Zinke	878 F.3d 316 (D.C. Cir. 2017)	This case dealt with an action brought past an organization of safari hunters and firearm advocacy association under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS), challenging the decision to append imports of sport-hunted African elephant trophies from Zimbabwe. The U.South. District Courtroom for the District of Columbia entered summary judgment in FWS's favor, and the organization and association appealed. Under the ESA, sport-hunted African elephant trophies may only be imported into the Usa if, among other things, the FWS makes "[a] determination ... that the killing of the trophy brute will enhance the survival of the species". The Court of Appeals held that i) FWS'south interpretation of Special Rule forbidding import of sport-hunted elephant trophies was permissible; 2) FWS could base finding that killing of African elephants did non enhance species' survival on absence of evidence that sport hunting enhanced survival of species; 3) FWS'southward conclusion that it lacked prove to brand finding that killing African elephants in Zimbabwe would enhance survival of species rebutted any presumption that importation did non violate any provision of ESA or regulation issued pursuant to ESA; 4) removal of enhancement requirement from Convention on International Merchandise in Endangered Species of Wild fauna and Flora did not require FWS to reconsider Special Rule; 5) finding constituted rule rather than adjudication; and 6) FWS'due south failure to engage in notice-and-comment prior to finding was not harmless error. Affirmed in office and reversed in part, and remanded so the FWS can initiate rule making to address enhancement findings for the time periods at issue in this case.
Pearson v Janlin Circuses Pty Ltd	[2002] NSWSC 1118	The defendant deprived an elephant in a circus of contact with other elephants for years. On a particular solar day, the defendant authorised iii other elephants to exist kept in the proximity of the elephant for a number of hours. It was claimed that this act constituted an act of cruelty every bit it caused distress to the elephant. On appeal, information technology was determined that mens rea was not an element of a cruelty offence under the statute.

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Source: https://www.animallaw.info/cases/species/elephants-or-ivory?order=field_primary_citation&sort=asc

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